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Mann: Well, I invite you to continue to enjoy that fine lunch while I
make a few remarks. They've given me a full hour; I'm not certain that we
can wake up that many people after a full hour of listening to me, so continue
to eat, and I'll try not to fall asleep during the presentation, as well. I do
really expressly want to thank Logan Shipman and Taylor McCallman and
all of those that are responsible for putting on the Silent Machine, and the
sponsors, Owens & Miller, we're appreciative of them, as well. Anyone here
from that group? Well, we thanked them last night, and we certainly thank
them again.
I go back in time, walking around and looking at portraits of the deans
and how far the Campbell Law School has gone since it originated. When I
did my first clerkship, years ago, I clerked with Larry Davis, who remained
a lifelong mentor and a lifelong friend of mine, and I can remember, after
clerking with him-you know, that was an experience all in itself. He was a
little more detail-oriented than I was. Talking about the Campbell Law
School and how it was kind of struck off in his imagination. And here we
are today, many years ago, although he's not with us any longer-I'm sure
he's here in spirit, at what this law school has accomplished.
Another friend and mentor was Willis Whichard, who had a good
deal-along with Melissa Essary-responsibility of moving the law school
to Raleigh, and how much it has meant to the bar here in Raleigh, and
hopefully how much the bar has meant to the law school. So it is a real
experience in growth. I look at the number of the graduates of this law school
who are members of the judiciary now, and it's an incredible number. And
it's incredible how this law school has worked itself into the fabric of Wake
County and the City of Raleigh, and how much this law school has meant to
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us, and the visionaries that got it to the point where it is now, I think, would
be pleased.
I can't remember not knowing Dean Leonard. I don't know if he's here
or not. If he's here, I won't say anything nice about him, but if he's not here,
you just need to know how fortunate you are to have someone of his caliber
and his standing, as you've had with many of the deans of this law school.
He's really the Energizer Bunny that has just-constant source of energy and
a constant source of new developments, and I think it's quite appropriate
when he asked what exactly can be done to make administrative law more
relevant in your curriculum.
It seems to me that just being in the capital city, which most is the center
of administrative law, that it can be so relevant, because you just kind of step
outside-it's like Anna Choi said, you just kind of step outside, and you're
in the middle of it all the time. So it's appropriate that this law school, of all
the law schools, is right here and prepared to enter the administrative law
practice, and it's no-it's no mystery. Once you learn how to try a case, and
once you learn how to try-be a bench trial, that's pretty much
administrative law. So it's not so much what you have to learn about the
actual trial, it's the kind of the other things that surround it that are somewhat
different, and I intend to speak a little bit to that point.
There are many people in this room that I have learned from. One of
them is walking out-I hope he's not leaving. Judge Abe Jones, who's a
great practitioner and turned to an administrative law judge and Superior
Court judge. We are proud to have him as a graduate of OAH, and along
with some others. I know that Fred Morrison is here; I always learn from
Fred, and if you ever really want to settle a case, get Judge Morrison to
mediate your case, because it will be settled. Jack Nichols is here, Don
Overby is here. I don't think Nick Fountain is here, but he's certainly one
that I recognize.
I want to also recognize Caroline Martin, who has assisted me in this
preparation, and if my voice gives out, she says she would be glad to come
forward and complete-she's shaking her head; I think that means "yes."
So-but she is clerking with us from UNC this semester, and she has
provided a lot of valuable experience. And as I was telling her, that a good
presentation essentially involves telling people what you're going to say,
saying it, and then telling them what you've said.
So, I'll give you just a little bit of where I'm going with this way-toolong lecture, and if you nod off, I certainly understand it, because that's the
nature of administrative law, but just try to change administrative law-try
to change the APA, and you will see it's like changing the revenue code.
You'll find everybody comes out of the woodwork to challenge you. So it
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may be boring in substance, but everybody's accustomed to it, -and

everybody has their own little view of it.
My talk really is going to end with the ABA model code of ethics for
state administrative law judges and where that came from, because it's been

a development that has been very long in the-in its history and its process,
but it's also come to culmination this last August, in the ABA Conventionat their annual meeting. But it basically has arisen from the destruction that
ex parte communications do in to administrative law. So we're going to talk
a little bit about that history, a little bit about the developments of state

administrative law, through Goldberg and Mathews-most of you are aware
of those-and the updates to what North Carolina has, which is a central
hearing agency or a central panel, and then a little bit more about the history
of the model code.

So let me begin-I don't want to leave anybody out, but I want to be
sure that I've recognized everyone. I want to begin with talking about a very
early case that I think was the real precursor to the evils of ex parte
communications, and it's Morgan v. The United States.' It's a 1938 United
States Supreme Court case, and it evolved-it involved a struggle by the
appellate courts, and that struggle by courts to come to grips with the
bureaucratic state, or as Justice Jackson said, the fourth branch of
government.
And you can see the judiciary in the early cases trying to do just that,
and it involved the Department of Agriculture. It didn't involve Justice
Morgan, who is here today, but same name, and some pretty egregious ex
parte communications that came up from an act-in 1921, Congress
authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to specify maximum just and
reasonable charges that stockyard operators could set for their services, and
they instructed the secretary to set those after a full hearing, and that was
going to be a full administrative hearing, and what the court believed should
be a full hearing and what the secretary believed should be a full hearing
were not the same. They were two different things, and the new secretary
that came in had stepped in the shoes of the previous secretary, and there was
a lot of data and information that was given to be considered at the hearing.
And what the secretary decided was, there should be no hearing, and
really went to the agency attorneys and the agency folks to say, "Well, what
does all this mean? You tell me what it means, you write the decision. We'll
kind of bypass the hearing, and we'll enter a decision." And of course when
the decision was entered, the other side knew very little about it, had no input
in it whatsoever, and that went up on appeal, ultimately making it to the
United States Supreme Court.
1. Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938).
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. Immediately, the court begins to apply a judicial overlay to what is a
bureaucratic administrative hearing. And we're saying, by example in an
equity case, a special master of the trial judge permitted the plaintiffs'
attorney to formulate the findings upon the evidence conferred ex parte with
the plaintiffs' attorney regarding them, and then adopted his proposals
without affording an opportunity to his opponent to know their contents and
present objections, there would be no hesitation in setting aside the report or
decree as having been made without a fair hearing.
They went to another analogy in the judicial branch and said, "If this
had happened in the judicial branch, it would be a no-brainer. This is not
fair, this is not according to law, and it was filled with ex parte
communications." And so the Supreme Court of the United States reversed
the secretary and sent the case back, but it was all based on ex parte
communications. And here we are, little bit less than 100 years later, still
trying to come to grips with the prohibition on ex parte communications.
From Morgan, the American Bar Association began to realize that
something needed to be done to provide some procedures to the-to theseto administrative procedures, and they got together, and there were two
views, that ultimately the latter view prevailed by FDR, that-during the
Roosevelt years and the New Deal, to not throw all of this into the judiciary,
but to create a separate body to-separate area of law in the executive
branch, because quite frankly, the judiciary had been tampering with FDR's
New Deal programs, even to the point that he was thinking about adding two
new Supreme Court justices to the United States Supreme Court.
Roscoe Pound, on behalf of the ABA-the famous dean of the Harvard
Law School-came out absolutely opposed to the APA, and anything that
would prevent it going through the judicial process. He wrote extensively
about his objections to it. And then you had those in the administration-Kenneth Culp Davis and some others-who immediately said, "No, we can't
have that process." And intervening in there was the World War II, it went
up and back. To make a long story short, FDR prevailed, and the federal
administrative law, APA, was put in place that provided some of the judicial
independence that Roscoe Pound was looking for, but nothing like what he
found.
It was this struggle among those that are in the judiciary to try to bring
fairness and due process and the standards that are applied in judicial branch
hearings into administrative law. Those, like back in Morgan, and Roscoe
Pound, looked at it from the protection of a citizen's right, constitutional
rights, and the APA and the executive and the President of the United States
was looking at it more about entitlements in protecting the agencies from
interference by the courts.
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So all of this continued to develop. There was not much going on in
the state level. There was-our APA goes back to the 1940s and primarily
dealt with professional licensing issues. But nothing really happened until
two United States Supreme Court cases were decided. One was Goldberg v.
Kelly2-involved food stamps, right to a fair and impartial food stamp
hearing. And Goldbergwas decided in 1970 by Justice Brennan, and in that
case, they were trying to, again, grapple with how do we look at this, from
the perspective of the citizen, or do we look at it from the perspective of the
agency? And Brennan did an astounding thing when he said that the right to
food stamps was a property interest just like real estate or an automobile or
tangible/intangible property, was exactly-was property and deserved
protections under the Fifth Amendment and applied to the State of New York
under the 14 th Amendment.
So we suddenly had the Constitution flying right in the middle of
administrative law in a state administrative law hearing, and what due
process was required? They said it wasn't-you didn't have to have the
requirement of a full judicial hearing, but you had to have notice, the
recipient had to have timely and adequate notice, they had to have-this was
a pre-termination hearing-the right to confront adverse witnesses and
presenting evidence, and last-and of course they said, "An impartial
decision maker is essential."
I think it is at that time that they were looking at, well, if this is true in
the State of New York and this is the 14 th Amendment being applied to an
administrative hearing, every time we take a property interest such as this,
are we going to have to be tested on the administrative procedures? And the
answer is, well, yes, that potential is out there. So then we begin to make
great strides in the 1970s in North Carolina and in other states, on coming up
with a uniform state Administrative Procedure Act that would capture all
administrative hearings under the same procedures. And this is my
thought-you're not going to find this in a law review article much
anywhere, unless I've written it, and I'm not sure everybody agrees thatwith my assessment of this.
And then they went on and they decided the next case, Mathews v.
Eldridge,3 and determined with federal disability, Social Security disability
rights, you did not have to have a pre-termination hearing as you-as was
required in Goldberg, so you had this kind of mix of United States Supreme
Court decisions as to exactly what due process was required. And they came
up with a test that you had to look at the interests that will be affected; a risk
of an erroneous deprivation; probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
2. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
3. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1975).
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procedural standards; and the government's interest in including the function
and exactly how much all of this would cost. I think it was a retreat by the
Supreme Court, six years later after Goldberg, that made it a little bit more
confusing. But by this time, I think the APAs were all ready to go, and it
ultimately, I think, turned out for the best. But whenever you are in an
administrative hearing and you feel like those fundamental property interests
are not being protected, you can still contest those procedures just as they
were originally protested in 1970.
We then move later in our state APA to the creation of the central panel
or the Office of Administrative Hearings-North Carolina was 13' in the
nation to create this independent cadre of administrative law judges who do
not work for the agency that investigated and prosecuted, but were taken out
and because of economies of scale and other reasons for impartiality, this has
become quite a new approach to administrative hearings, where at least you
remove the perception of bias, perception of unfairness. In many states, this
has been a slow process. The ABA has been working with the Appleseed
for Justice of Chicago in a study that Malcolm Rich, the director there, has
been doing, which has had a great influence on the State of Illinois, which
was the last state to provide a central hearing agency. And he had done
original study of the original seven central panels back in 1980, did a study
by the American Judicature Society, and then all these years later, he just
came out in 2019 with an upgrade of that study, including all 30 jurisdictions
in the United States-not all the states, but the City of Chicago, City of New
York, Washington, D.C., and Cook County all have a central hearing agency
now. So there was a lot to be studied, and he concluded that this was the
most efficient way to conduct state administrative hearings.
So we've gone full circle, and as I was preparing for this, and Ms.
Martin was a little bit confused when I told her to look at the State of Illinois
and their new legislation, and she kept telling me there was no new
legislation, and I said, "Well, I know there is," and I tricked her, because it
was the State of Indiana she was looking for, and she couldn't read my mind.
I don't know why that was, but we came up with the most recent enactment,
with the State of Indiana, has one of their houses last week passing legislation
creating a state central panel in Indiana.
I had gone out to Indiana in a law school symposium very similar to
this in 2002, where they were considering and debating whether Indiana
should create a central panel, and there was a lot of very positive work being
done there until we went to lunch-much like we're having lunch right now,
and one of the Supreme Court justices of Indiana came forward and said,
"I've read a law review article by a professor in South Carolina, who will
remain unnamed, and he's told us all the reasons why we should not create
a central panel, and I will be adamantly opposed to any legislation to create
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a central panel in Indiana." That was the end of that. We had an afternoon
program, but I don't believe many people showed up for it after the air went
out of the tire.
So I was surprised that Indiana had gone this far in now creating a
central panel, and it was preceded by a study, and it looks to be with the
appropriate exemptions from-that all of the-these statutes seem to have
agencies that are exempt or not going to be subject to the jurisdiction of the
central panel. Once that got resolved, I feel fairly confident that Indiana
Senate will pass this bill and they will be the addition. So that will be 31 and
32.
Now, let's see where we go here. The ex parte communication aspect
of this, and we have referred to it slightly-we've got this concern by many
litigants and others about the effect of control that may be exercised over
someone that is in the agency hearing the contested cases. The federal APA
ensured a great deal of judicial independence by the federal administrative
law judges, until the most recent Supreme Court decision in Lucia.' And
Lucia essentially said that all of the protections that are provided to the
federal administrative law judges and how they get to their job, which is
essentially from civil service and an exam, is now not the correct way,
because the President of the United States, through the Appointments
Clause, 5 gets to appoint the federal administrative law judges as inferior
officers-not ones that have to be confirmed by Congress, but they have to
be appointed by the president directly or by someone that the president
appoints. And so the civil service protections that had offered a great deal
of protection to the federal administrative law judges are now up in the air.
And it's not just that they have to be, or can be, appointed by the agency
heads as opposed to civil service, but that they may be removed by the
appointing authority, which would seem-well, the law is unsettled. It
doesn't seem to be very clear that the Appointments Clause doesn't preclude
protections for federal administrative law judges from removal, but it's
unclear, until the next United States Supreme Court decides this.
So, how would you like to go into traffic court and the judge being an
employee of the chief of police, and the chief of police sits there and looks
and decides, "Well, let's see how this judge handles this particular case, and
if I don't like it, then I'll get another employee up there to hear the case."
That's kind of a gross exaggeration, but the removal aspects under the
appointments clause add some instability to the whole process. Right now,
no federal administrative law judge I know is planning to apply to go to a
different agency, because if they are where they are now, there's some
4. Lucia v. Securities and Exchange Commission, __ U.S.__, 138 S.Ct. 2044 (2018).
5. Art, II, Sec. 2, Clause 2
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protections that they believe they have by way of tenure, and it only applies
to the new appointments. So no federal administrative law judges that I
know are searching to go from Social Security to the Department of Labor
or the Securities Exchange Commission.
We need to be following this very carefully, and one of the reasons I'm
talking about this in the discussion is, there was an attempt in the 1990s to
create a central hearing agency on the federal level. It was called the federal
corps bill, and it was shepherded by Howell Heflin, who was a former Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of Alabama that had turned to the United States
Senate and decided that these protections were necessary. And he was very
successful in moving his bill through the United States Senate, and it passed
there, and he also moved it through the United States House of
Representatives-just not in the same session. And it never made law.
There was a lot of opposition to it, and it go-went back to that philosophy
about, are we doing a judicial role in an administrative hearing, or are we
looking at it more from a policy perspective and the agency's perspective.
And it did not pass.
It then died with him. He died at the end of the 1990s, and with him
pretty much this federal corps bill, which is now being looked at again-very
seriously, .in my opinion. Had the federal government gone to the corps bill,
so many of the headaches that they're now being experienced in the federal
APA would not be present. So we'll see whether that-what happens to that,
but that's a little bit of the history and where we're going with that.
Now, we've got this-the history of this model code and what has
happened to it. North Carolina, very early, in the late 1990s, decided-with
a few pushes here and there-that the administrative law judges and the
Office of Administrative Hearings needed to be subject to a code of ethics.
The American Bar Association, in 1995, created a model code of judicial
conduct for state administrative law judges, reflecting very long efforts at
creating it. It was through NCALJ-that's the National Conference of the
Administrative Law Judiciary in the ABA; the state practices committee,
chaired by Ed Felter, then the chief administrative law judge in the State of
Colorado; the NCALJ committee on ethics and responsibility, which was
chaired by Ronnie Yoder, who's a federal administrative law judge; and
Judge Felter. I participated somewhat in that in the late 1990s. along with
John Hardwick, the chief administrative law judge in Maryland. A lot of
effort went into that, and through the push that Ed Felter gave to it, the
National Conference of the Administrative Law Judiciary created a model
code of ethics for state administrative law judges, and that is the one that is
presently incorporated in our statute that regulates the state administrative
law judges in the Office of Administrative Hearings.
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Well, as time went by, that code became slightly obsolete, particularly
when the American Bar Association in 2007 adopted a new code of ethics
for the judicial branch judges, not the administrative law judges. And that
changed a little bit of the predecessor codes. So Ed Felter and I worked
together in 2017 and 2016 to try to bring this code up to what it is today. He
was assisted by Lorraine Lee, who was the chief administrative law judge in
the State of Washington, and John Allen, who was the chief administrative
law judge for Cook County. They came up with this code, and we then
shopped it around and tried to get approval of different bodies in the ABA.
We ran into a little bit of a buzz saw when we got to the administrative
law and regulatory practice section of the ABA, and they again went
immediately to the ex parte communications prohibitions in the model code,
saying, "You can't have this kind of-you can't silence this kind of
communication that goes on in agencies," and we basically said, "Well, yes
we can, and we really want to be sure that we have even more strenuous
prohibitions against ex parte communications."
Well, we reached a compromise with them, and what they said is that
that will apply to the state administrative law judges, but it will not apply to
the directors who are making the final decisions, or who are those that are
consulting. So with that exception, you'll see right in the very first tier thatin that preamble, it says very clearly that those directors are not covered by
this. Nobody is covered by this model act until it is adopted in the
jurisdiction. This is a model and a model only.
So we go-with that prohibition, North Carolina, we went to the House
of Delegates with that compromise in 2018, and the House of Delegates of
the American Bar Association adopted it without dissent, and it was part of,
I think, a response to what some of the lawyers were seeing in the ABA from
Lucia. There was a concern about that, and so we were successful, and thisthe difference in this ABA model and the previous NCALJ model is that
NCALJ is a conference in the judicial division of the ABA, and the only
entity that had approved the previous model was NCALJ. So, we got the
approval of the entire judicial division of the ABA, and then we got the entire
approval of the House of Delegates, which made it an ABA model code.
This has become significantly important because it not only has this
extensive prohibition on ex parte communications, but it affects the integrity
of judicial independence. These canons read individually and in totality
are-contain a great deal of prohibitions about what judges cannot do, and
in that it protects the impartiality of the judge and it protects the judge'snot only their judicial conduct on the bench, but their nonjudicial conduct.
Again, these only apply to the judges and the hearing officers that adopt
them. If they're not adopted, these do not apply.
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So, if you look at the first canon here, an administrative law judge shall
uphold and promote the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the
administrative law judiciary and avoid the appearance of impropriety. That
is kind of a general statement. There are comments that further refine all of
that, but the judges are to promote public confidence in the independence,
integrity, and impartiality of the administrative law judiciary, and shall avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety, which sometimes is difficult
for that ALJ that is embedded in the agency. But as you can see, I am
promoting, today, confidence in the administrative law judiciary, and I'm
doing it because Canon 1 says I have to. Okay. [LAUGHTER]
An administrative law judge shall perform the duties of the office
impartially, competently, and diligently. It is this last part here that I became
very interested in several years ago, and how long it would take to get a case
to go through the Office of Administrative Hearings. This is reflective of the
judicial canon as well. Judges in the judicial branch have to be concerned
about the diligent disposition of their cases. Literally, justice delayed is
justice denied. Bless you.
An ALJ shall uphold and apply the law and shall perform all duties of
office fairly and impartially; 2.3, the administrative law judge shall avoid
bias, prejudice, and harassment. What external influences should be avoided
by judicial conduct? If you don't think there is clamor in the administrative
law arena--of course all you have to do is look at what happened in the
Board of Elections yesterday and the day before and the day before that. You
didn't even have to watch Spectrum News. I mean, you could watch any
national news network and there it was.
And what about the public clamor or fear of criticism that would have
been embedded in those judges, and with Judge Morrison-I don't know if
he's still here or not, but he's-he may not be, but his case involved the death
penalty and a challenge to the Council of State's approval of the type of drugs
that could be used in capital punishment. There was a great deal of clamor
and fear of criticism, and we from time-and I know that Judge Overby was
going to make somebody in one section of the state very happy with his water
transfer and another section quite unhappy. He may not have known-he
probably only heard from the people that were happy. I happened to hear
from a lot of people who were unhappy, but it's-these cases can be quite
significant, and they can involve a great deal of public concern.
Competence, diligence, and cooperation: an ALJ shall perform judicial
and administrative duties competently and diligently, cooperate with legal
professionals and other officials in the administration of official business. If
these sound familiar to you, they are. These are the same, almost the
identical canons that are-govern the judicial, that are in the model code of
judicial conduct for the judicial branch judges.
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Responsibility to decide: they shall hear and decide matters assigned to
the ALJ, except upon disqualification. If you're ever in that place where you
have to, you know, make an unpopular decision, your motive is to
procrastinate. You think, "Oh, no, I don't want to do this," but you have to
decide. And I know that Judge Leonard, when he was on the bench,
occasionally got in those same dilemmas.
Ex parte communications-here they are. Now, there's two things that
govern ex parte communication. We have the provisions in Rule 2.9: an ALJ
shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications, or consider
other communications made to the ALJ outside the presence of the parties or
their lawyers considering a pending or impending matter, including
communications from an agency litigant, except with these minor
exceptions. And those are pretty-well-accepted exceptions in the judicial
branch.
We also have, compatible with this section in the canons, G.S. 150B356: unless required for disposition of an ex parte matter authorized by law,
the ALJ assigned to a contested case may not communicate directly or
indirectly in connection with any issue of fact or question of law, with any
person or party or its representative, except on notice and on opportunity for
all parties to participate. You can't do it.
And if there's one person that will be mentioned and honored next
week, Sammie Chess, who has already been-you've already been told that
he was the first African American admin-Superior Court judge appointed
as a special Superior Court judge, way back in the '60s or early '70s. Ask
him, when he was practicing law, in the early times of civil rights-he was
a great civil rights lawyer and then was a really terrific Superior Court judge,
just like Abe Jones and Justice Morgan-but it wasn't uncommon for
someone that was in a minority to walk into a scene where the adversary was
in speaking with the judge ex parte. It happened, according to Judge Chess,
time and again. And if you want to know his feelings about the prohibition
on ex parte communication, all you have to do is ask him and be prepared to
listen for about an hour, why this is important.
So, I think we've gone a long way since the Morgan case was decided
and the egregious ex parte communications that were stopped by the
Supreme Court, but the issue is still alive on the federal level, and there's
that tension between a judicial hearing protecting a citizen and an agency's
right to make policy. And the ex parte communications seem to follow
whatever direction you side with in that controversy.
It goes on and further defines statements on pending and impending
cases. It talks about disqualification, where a judge has a conflict of
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 150B-35 (2017).
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interest-mostly financial, where you own-you have stocks and other
property interests, or relationships, that would prevent you from making a
fair and unbiased decision. Now, when you go into these agencies and places
where those are not covered by these model rules, there is no prohibition,
and you may not ever know about them. But a judge that is under these
canons is not only being asked when someone confronts them; they have to
make this analysis themselves while they're on the bench. And if they see
anything in here that creates a conflict for them, they are to put that on the
record and make the decision about it.
And not only does this apply to the judge, it applies to those that the
judge supervises in 2.12. Extrajudicial activities in general, what judges can
do off the bench, is also subject to bias. Appearances before governmental
agencies in consultation with governmental officials-and there's a lot in the
weeds here. You've got to be-read these things carefully, because you can
find as a judge violating some of this without ever really knowing that you
are.
So it's very important, and one of the things that Indiana did, and I'll
read to you what-where they went with their new legislation. Section 10
of the new legislation. The director shall do the following: adopt rules
establishing a code of judicial conduct for administrative law judges. The
code ofjudicial conduct for administrative law judges applies to each person
acting as an administrative law judge in the Office of Administrative
Hearings.
Next, receive complaints alleging violations of the code of judicial
conduct, investigate the complaints, and take administrative or disciplinary
action as deemed appropriate. Seven, next one: provide and coordinate
education for administrative law judges on the code of judicial conduct for
administrative law judges, professionalism, administrative practices, and
other subjects necessary to carry out the purpose of this chapter. Render
advisory opinions to administrative law judging concerning the code of
judicial conduct, information/advice contained in an advisory opinion or
considered specific to the person who requests, in confidential-point I'm
making with this is there's a good deal of focus, out of the directions given
to the director, in creating this new office. I would say at least 30% of them
are just addressed to a code of judicial conduct.
So, in our office we've had one meeting of our administrative law
judges on this issue. We have legal counsel that can advise our judges on
how this works, and we are going to master all of what is required of us in
these new canons. So I think Judge Overby can now address all of these
questions that we're about to be asked. Now, we're still struggling.
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My time's about to expire, and I want to give you an opportunity to ask
any questions, and I greatly appreciate you not going to sleep while I was
talking. [LAUGHTER] Yes?
M: What do you see as one of the major differences between this model
code of conduct for administrative law judges and the one for other judges?
Mann: They are almost identical. I haven't gone through the 2007, but
the 2007 ABA model was an overlay. It's almost precisely and exactly the
same. There's a few comments that we had to remove from the 2007 code
because it did not apply to the state administrative law judges, and of course
the big difference was the ex parte communications are not prevented by the
final decision maker or the ones advising the final decision maker. So I guess
we've come full circle back to Morgan, because the Morgan case dealt with
a secretary of agriculture, so I'm not sure we've gone--come that far in
helping that problem, but those that are actually conducting the hearing as a
judge, those prohibitions are very clear. Yes?
M: I have a question about the character witness limitation right there.
It strikes me that there could be many situations where ALJs could be good
character witnesses and it could be really important for, you know, maybe
even just due process purposes. And we have-we allow many other people
with important positions where people sort of give weight to their positions
in doing their-in assessing their character determinations. And I wonder
sort of why was it sort of-why was the decision made to go in that direction
and to require a subpoena and sort of, you know, have a sort of, a little bit
hostile environment, right? It's a cost-it's a compulsory environment,
when there's a lot of sort of upsides to being able to have character witnesses.
Mann: I'm trying to get to that one because there is a comment under
it.
M: Yeah, it was Rule 3.1, I think. Or not 3.1, sorry. It's 3-something.
It was the last slide you were on; there it is, 3.3.
Mann: Okay. ALJs shall not testify as character witnesses in a judicial
administrative or other judicatory proceedings, or otherwise vouch for the
character of a person in a legal proceeding, except when duly summonedyou can do it under a subpoena. An ALJ who, without being subpoenaed,
testifies as a character witness, abuses the prestige of the AL' s office to
advance the interest of another; see Rule 1.3, except in unusual
circumstances where the demands of justice require an ALJ, should
discourage a party from requiring the ALJ to testify as a character witness.
What little I know about this is-you got someone that does have the
answer? Okay. What little I know about it-it came from the judicial code,
and I think it was in our previous NCALJ code, as well, and I have been
called to be a character witness in a case that I really wanted to present myself
as a character witness, and I couldn't do it because of this prohibition. And
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I had the same question: why is it that I can't do it? I guess it would bear, in
a judicial setting, where one judge would come in, like a justice of the
Supreme Court would come before a Superior Court judge and testify as a
character witness, that might put an inordinate amount of influence on that
witness. Anybody else have an answer to that professor's questions?
Well, I'll close with this. I probably shouldn't read this, but since our
professor talked about it last night, Jeff Rosen is-was a previous chair of
the administrative law and regulatory section of the ABA, and he was-he
had some views about Chevron,7 and he is now being considered to being
the deputy attorney general of the United States. And when he retired, when
he stepped off as the chair, you're supposed to write him a little note, and
this is what I wrote him. And I've never read this to anybody else, and it's
only funny to me because I'm certain it wasn't funny to him.
"In light of the extraordinary service that Jeff Rosen has given to the
administrative law and regulatory practice section, I highly recommend that
we immediately purchase for Jeff a brand-new Chevron."8 [LAUGHTER]
"Chevron at its height of popularity was a simple model, but now many
describe the current model as overly complex, with equally complex
competitors, such as the hour. The only real consumers are scholars and
others who practice who drive us into the darkness where our practitioners
fear to tread. Notwithstanding that in many parts of the country, the new
Chevron is flourishing; in others, it may be vanishing, but certainly we dare
not say vanishing in our nation's capital, the hotbed of Chevronism, where
Jeff is an esteemed practitioner of administrative law."
This was back when one house of Congress had condemned Chevron.
"One house of Congress has condemned Chevron as unsafe for our
democracy, so we must act quickly before the other chamber has its say.
Since time is of the essence, I move the immediate purchase of a new
Chevron for Jeff as a lasting token of our esteem; alas, before our Chevron
goes the way of the Edsel." [LAUGHTER]
So, that will conclude. I may be the only one thought it was funny, and
I'm certain that Jeff did not think it was funny.
[END RECORDING]

7. Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1983).
8. Id.
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